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Abstract

The primary purpose of this research is to assess the practicality of utilizing some
of the financial derivative products available on the market today in an effort to mitigate
monetary losses due to the increasing price of jet fuel, thereby increasing stability in the
DOD budget. The scope of this research will focus on the use of futures and call option
contracts. Domestic jet fuel expenditure data was collected for Fiscal Years 1996 to 2007
and cross-referenced with the contract process of the previously mentioned financial
hedging instruments during the same period of time.
Results from the ex post facto analysis indicate that hedging with either heating
oil futures or heating oil call options would have provided a tremendous overall savings
to the DoD. Currently the DoD does not hedge its budget against fluctuation in the jet
fuel spot market. The implication from this study is that the DoD should consider
hedging its jet fuel exposure with either derivative, in particular call options as it is
tailored for risk adverse customers.
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JET FUEL HEDGING STRATEGIES FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THROUGH USE OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES

I. Introduction
Overview
Oil is one of the most important commodities on the global stage today and the
United States consumed nearly 24.8 percent of the global supply in 2006 (EIA, 2008). It
is the lifeblood of the global economy and the keystone asset required to sustain every
industrialized nation. From being a factor in deciding what form of transportation we
will use for travel to our National Defense Strategy; oil is everywhere in our lives.
Consumption data from the Energy Information Agency (EIA) illustrates that as of 26
September 2008, the United States consumes roughly 18.5 million barrels per day of
petroleum-based products. This consumption quantity is nearly eight percent lower from
the 20.2 million barrels per day quantity taken from the same time in 2007. Price is a
major factor in driving oil consumption and the average price for per barrel increased
substantially from 2007 to 2008. In 2007, the average price per barrel of crude oil was
trading for nearly 72 dollars and in 2008, the price increased to all most 150 dollars per
barrel before the September crash. This statistic clearly demonstrates the impact that
price has on the demand of petroleum-based products and the importance of oil in our
everyday lives.
Over the past five years, the price per barrel of crude oil has grown dramatically.
This price increase has created record-high prices for all by-products of crude oil,
including Aviation Fuel, otherwise known as jet fuel. To put this into perspective, in
1

FY02, the Department of Defense (DoD) procured roughly 1.9 billion gallons of jet fuel
on the domestic spot market at a total cost of nearly 1.3 billion dollars. In comparison,
the DoD procured 1.5 billion gallons of jet fuel on the same spot market at a total cost
that was slightly over 3 billion dollars in FY07 (DESC, 2008). Ultimately, this means
that in FY07 the DoD purchased 80 percent of the jet fuel that it used in FY02 for a cost
that was 230 percent higher.
Large price fluctuations in the crude oil market make the price of crude extremely
volatile. Considering that jet fuel is a by-product of crude oil, there is a high correlation
between the price of crude oil and jet fuel. The spot market price of jet fuel and the
futures price of crude oil have a correlation factor of 0.9964. Figure 1 illustrates this
correlation over the past twelve years, data obtained from the EIA.

Price per Barrel

Jet Fuel (Spot)

Crude Oil (Futures)
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Figure 1. Commodity Price Correlation
Derived from crude oil, jet fuel goes through a refining process to achieve its final
usable state. This refining cost causes the price of jet fuel to be slightly higher than the
2

price of crude oil. Due to its derivative relationship with crude oil, many of the same
factors that drive the crude oil market affect the price of jet fuel. Commercial airlines
mitigate their exposure to the crude oil market by using a fuel hedge and many believe
that it would be prudent for the DoD to implement a similar strategy. This paper will
examine some of the strategies available to the DoD that could help reduce its exposure
to the high volatility associated with the price of jet fuel. With a reduction in exposure to
price volatility, the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) should be able to provide the
DoD with a stable jet fuel price, this is currently not the case.
Current Procedures
Currently the DESC procures all of the jet fuel used by the DoD throughout the
fiscal year. DESC utilized the Defense Working Capital Fund (DWCF) to purchase more
than 132 million barrels of fuel at a cost of 11.5 billion dollars in 2007 (DESC, 2008).
The DWCF is a revolving fund that provides goods and services for the component
military forces. DWCF Business Areas sell goods or services with the intent of
recovering the total cost incurred. Unlike profit-oriented commercial businesses, DWCF
Business Areas strive to break even over the long term, and set prices accordingly.
Allowing the DWCF to operate at a loss one year and then a profit the next creates a zero
sum gain. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Comptroller establishes a
stabilized standard price for aviation fuel, relying heavily upon Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) forecasted crude oil prices. This standard price is to provide the
military with budget stability using the DWCF reserves to absorb any volatility in the
market. Over the past five years, the DWCF has had a difficult time in providing stable
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fuel prices to the DoD, causing a great deal budget instability for the armed services.
Figure 2 shows the historical DESC standard price and the historical spot price of jet fuel
from October 1995 to August 2008.

JP-8 Price Per Gallon

Jet Fuel Spot (ppg)

DESC Stand Price (ppg)
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Figure 2. Historical Jet Fuel & DESC Standard Price Comparison
Prior to FY05, DESC provided a stable price to the DoD, only changing the
standard price at the beginning of every fiscal year. However, starting in FY05 price
volatility has forced DESC to change the standard price for jet fuel during the fiscal year.
This adjustment in price makes it increasingly difficult for the services to budget
appropriately for jet fuel, forcing the services to rely on Congressional supplemental
funding in order to maintain mission readiness. In light of this escalating problem, OMB
has urged the DoD to develop a strategy to include fuel hedging in its risk-control arsenal
to deal with rampant prices of aviation fuel (Defense Business Board, 2004). Providing a
stabilized standard fuel price is supposed to be one of strengths of the DWCF but this
does not seem to be the case. To highlight this point, every year since 1992 Congress has
4

adjusted either the budget-year fuel prices or appropriated additional funding to meet
shortfalls (Chinn, Le Blanc, & Corbion, 2001). High price volatility has been the major
driving force in underperforming forecasts in recent years. This volatility has caused the
forecast to be grossly inaccurate and ultimately forced DESC to alter the standard price of
fuel during the fiscal year. A 2002 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
examining fuel pricing concluded, “DoD has been trying to successfully implement the
working capital fund concept for over 50 years. However, Congress has repeatedly noted
weaknesses in DoD’s ability to use this mechanism to effectively control costs and
operate in a business-like fashion” (GAO, 2002). Due to market volatility, the DWCF
can either underestimate or overestimate the market strength each year. A scenario of
insufficient funding is realized when the market is underestimated and there is high price
volatility, leaving the DWCF unable to sustain itself. This forces DESC to change the
standard price of fuel mid-year and share the increased burden with the DoD. In turn,
the Services scramble for additional funding or take money from other programs to pay
for the increase in fuel price (OSD, 2006). When the market is overestimated, then there
is less money available for investment. Ultimately, current practices do not enable the
DoD to plan and budget more confidently, in accordance with the DWCF’s mandate.
Commercial Sector
The DoD is not the only consumer of aviation fuel that has endured these cost
increases, the commercial airline industry has suffered as well. For every one-dollar per
barrel increase in aviation fuel, the airlines collectively pay 425 million dollars in
additional operating costs. Realizing this, a majority of the airlines have developed risk
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management strategies to hedge a portion of their jet fuel needs for future use. Since
September 11, 2001, Southwest Airlines is the most notable commercial carrier to
implement a fuel hedge strategy and they are the only major US airline that consistently
turns a profit (Alexander, 2004).
Southwest owes a great deal of its recent success to their fuel hedge strategy; it
maintains a long-term fuel hedge program to keep its costs down. Within its fuel hedge
portfolio, Southwest has purchased fuel options for years in advance to smooth out
fluctuations in fuel costs. While hedging has provided a great deal of success in the past
for Southwest, the recent decrease in the price per barrel of oil is forcing Southwest to
realize a higher cost per gallon for fuel than its un-hedged competitors. Since Southwest
uses a variety of derivatives to hedge, this increased cost will likely be marginal and
equal only the premium amount associated with the contract.
In 2000, Southwest said it had "adjusted its hedging strategy" to "utilize financial
derivative instruments... when it appears the Company can take advantage of market
conditions" (SEC, 2001). Additionally, the company hoped to "take advantage of
historically low jet fuel prices” (SEC, 2001). Southwest's foresight on the market
positioned them to make profit windfalls in the following years. Southwest utilized a
mixture of swaps and call options to secure fuel for future years while paying prices they
believed were historically low. Prior to this change in strategy, Southwest hoped for
reduced volatility in oil prices, just like a vast majority of other airlines. However, with
the hedge in place, they now hoped for high prices and they got what they wanted.
Higher prices allowed Southwest to capitalize off their investment and have a competitive
advantage when setting fare prices. The use of fuel hedging helped Southwest maintain
6

its profitability during the oil shocks related to the Iraq War and during the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina. According to the 2006 Southwest Annual report, on average
Southwest paid less for a barrel of jet fuel than the Spot Market price from 2003 to 2006
because of its fuel hedge (SEC, 2006). Table 1 depicts the Southwest and Spot Market
average annual price per gallon for jet fuel from 2003 to 2006. The delta represents the
average amount of savings per gallon that Southwest obtained because of its hedged
position.
Table 1. Southwest versus Spot Market Annual Price per Gallon
Year
2003
2004
2005
2006

Southwest Average Price
$0.73
$0.83
$1.03
$1.53

Spot Market Average Price
$0.87
$1.20
$1.72
$1.95

Delta
$0.13
$0.37
$0.68
$0.42

At the conclusion of 2007, Southwest Airlines had a 95 percent hedged position in
place at a price of 50 dollars per barrel; this position will decrease substantially moving
forward. According to the Wall Street Journal as of October 2007 Southwest Airlines
had the hedge positions shown in Table 2. Table 2 shows the price per barrel that
Southwest already maintains for its forecasted consumption amount for each year. Using
2008 as an example year, Southwest had 65 percent of its projected fuel consumption
hedged at a cost of 49 dollars per barrel.
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Table 2. Southwest Fuel Hedge Position
Year Position
2008
65%
2009
50%
2010
25%
2011
15%
2012
15%

Price per Barrel
$49.00
$51.00
$63.00
$64.00
$63.00

In light of the current fluctuations in the oil market, these amounts could change
significantly in the near future.
Problem Statement
Due to the erratic fluctuations in price for aviation fuel on the spot market over
the past several years, the DoD has had to allocate additional financial resources to cover
these unexpected costs creating unanticipated shortfalls during the current fiscal year
Research Question
The focus of this research is to determine the practicality and potential outcomes
of utilizing two unique financial derivatives to reduce DoD financial losses caused from
the increasing price of jet fuel. This research utilizes an ex post facto methodology,
based off DoD cost and consumption data from Fiscal Year 96 to Fiscal Year 09. This
analysis uses secondary cost data for two forms of financial derivatives covering the
same period. We are going to compare how much the DoD did pay with the net amount
it would have paid had a fuel hedging strategy been in place.
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Significance
The significance of this research is that the DoD could potentially mitigate its
exposure to the volatility of the crude oil market by implementing a hedging program.
This reduction in exposure to price fluctuations could lead to a reduction of monetary
losses due to the increased price of jet fuel on the spot market in the long run. There is a
potential for millions of dollars in annual savings for the DoD. The DoD could use these
savings to sustain mission operations reduce the need for supplemental funding.
Assumptions
One of the main assumptions of this research is that the world energy market
contains enough liquidity to allow DoD entry into these markets without significantly
influencing the price of the underlying derivative.
Chapter Summary
This study attempts to leverage off historical commodity cost data to create mock
fuel hedging scenarios, determining if a financial savings could have be realized in the
Department of Defense had a hedge strategy been implemented. To develop these
scenarios, we use an ex-post facto methodology on the recorded commodity cost data
over the past decade. The study uses recorded jet fuel spot prices as well as heating oil
futures and call option prices. While the Department of Defense must procure fuel
regardless the cost, this study seeks to reduce the total cost spent on fuel over the lifetime
of the analysis and provide a greater base for budgetary stability for the armed services.
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II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
This chapter provides an overview of the research previously completed involving
fuel hedging. We first describe terminology, concepts and instruments used in this study
along with previous qualitative fuel hedging and quantitative currency hedging studies
done. Covering risk management next and then some legal issues involving fuel hedging.
From the information gathered in this chapter, we develop a historical and logical
framework for the ex-post facto methodology scenario.
Terminology, Concepts and Instruments
The world of finance has its own unique language that is foreign to most
individuals; this portion of the literature review will cover the terminology and concepts
of the financial world that are required to understand this paper
Derivatives
The primary purpose of a derivative is to transfer risk from one party to another.
A derivative is a financial instrument whose value is determined from either a cash
market commodity, futures contract, or other financial instrument. Common types of
derivatives include forwards, futures, options and swaps contracts (CME, 2006).
Futures Contract
Standardized forward contracts gave birth to today’s futures contract. A futures
contract is simply a standardized legally binding agreement between a buyer and seller in
which the contract specifies the quantity, predetermined price, and future delivery date of
10

the purchased commodity. The two main types of future contracts are physical delivery
and cash settled. For a physical delivery contract, to settle open positions (positions not
yet offset in the marketplace) in the market an offsetting futures trade or acceptance
physical delivery is required. On the other hand, closing a cash-settled future contract
position requires the seller to make an offsetting futures trade or simply leaving it alone
and make one final mark-to-market settlement adjustment to close the position.
According to the Chicago Board of Trade, only 3 percent of all futures contracts result in
physical delivery or cash settlement, offsetting the other 97 percent on the market. This
means that the majority of participants close out their positions prior to the contract’s
delivery date. If liquidation of these contracts does not occur by the last trading day of
the contract month, comparing the position’s price with a special final settlement price to
either debit or credit the position is required before closing it out (CME, 2006).
Traded easily as standardized contracts, futures contracts may exchange
ownership numerous times before the specified delivery date. It is in these exchanges of
ownership that “speculating” takes place.
Forward Contract
A forward contract otherwise known as a cash forward sale is a private
negotiation between a buyer and seller in the present that establishes the price and
quantity of a commodity for delivery at a specified time in the future. Once delivered to
the buyer, the commodity changes hands of ownership and payment is settled.

Forward

contracts differ from futures contracts by allowing payments to occur on a daily basis,
enabling partial payments over the life of the contract. This type of instrument was
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particularly useful to merchants and farmers in the mid 1800s because it enabled them to
lock in prices for a future delivery date, allowing them to hedge against price volatility in
the market. To prevent either party involved in the trade from defaulting on the
transaction, both parties are required to deposit a negotiated amount to a third party for
holding until settlement. If one party breaks the agreement and defaults on the contract,
the other member receives the deposited amount as compensation (CME, 2006).
Exercise
The action or ability of the buyer of an options contract to buy or sell the
underlying futures contract. An option holder is the only individual who can exercise an
option. Call holders can exercise the option to buy and put holders can exercise the
option to sell the underlying future (NYMEX, 2004).
Strike Price
A strike price is the price at which the holder may exercise the option.
Established when the option is first written, it along with time until expiration, volatility
of the underlying security, and the current interest rate determines the premium amount to
be paid for the option. For call options, the strike price is the purchase price of the
commodity. For a put option, the strike price is the selling price of the commodity
(NYMEX, 2004).
Premium
The price paid by the buyer to the seller in addition to the amount the futures price
of the commodity. For example, if heating oil futures are trading for 80 dollars a barrel
and call options are being sold for 83 dollars a barrel then the call option would have a
12

three-dollar premium associated with it. The premium amount is the penalty the buyer
will have to pay to the seller if they decide to let the contract expire instead of exercising
the contract.
A variety of factors affect the monetary value of option premiums, including
strike price as it relates to the underlying futures price, time until contract expiration and
market volatility (NYMEX, 2004).
Underlying Futures Contract
The underlying is the price of the corresponding futures contract for that
commodity. The September heating oil commodity contract is the underlying contract
for September heating oil call and put options (NYMEX, 2004).
Volatility
Volatility is high in an environment where prices are rising or falling
significantly. Alternatively, when a futures contract shows little price movement or
increased stability, volatility is low. Commodities that experience high volatility garner
higher premiums on their options on futures contracts. Increased price stability coupled
with decreased volatility environments generally cause options premiums to decline.
Volatility coupled with time until expiration, strike price, and the current interest rate
determines the premium amount for the option (NYMEX, 2004).
In-the-money
Having positive intrinsic economic value, a call option is in the money when the
commodity futures price exceeds the option’s strike price. For example, a December
heating oil call option is in the money if the December strike price were beneath the
13

futures trading price. Enabling the option holder the ability to exercise the contract and
obtain the commodity at a value less than the market rate (NYMEX, 2004).
At-the-money
Having neither positive nor negative intrinsic economic value, an option is at-themoney when the futures price and the strike price are equal to one another (NYMEX,
2004).
Out-of-the-money
Having a negative intrinsic economic value, a call option is out-of-the-money
when the commodity futures price is less than the option’s strike price while a put is outof-the-money when the commodities futures price is above the option's strike price
(NYMEX, 2004).
Call Option Contract
Call option futures contracts provide the buyer the right to purchase the
underlying futures contract at an agreed upon strike price; but it does not obligate them to
do so. This instrument does obligate the seller to sell the underlying if the buyer chooses
to exercise the call option. The buyer pays a premium for the option, compensating the
investor for the risk associated with fluctuations in the price of the underlying stock or
commodity. From an investors perspective, the buyer of a call wants the value of the
underlying to increase after they have purchased the option because then they will make a
profit off their investment (CME, 2006).
Call options on futures contracts differ from typical futures contracts in that they
provide the buyer with a way out of the contract that only costs the buyer the amount of
14

the premium. The following example highlights the differences between the two types of
contacts a buyer face when purchasing heating oil contracts. Assume that a barrel of
heating oil is trading for 80 dollars per barrel on the futures market. Buyer 1 purchases a
futures contract for 80 dollars per barrel; buyer 2 purchases a call option on the futures
contract for 80 dollars per barrel plus a 3-dollar premium, totaling 83 dollars per barrel.
Both contracts are for the same quantity of heating oil and expire at the same time. After
some time goes by both contracts reach their expiration date and heating oil is now
trading for 70 dollars per barrel. In this scenario, buyer 1 would be forced to pay the
agreed upon 80 dollars per barrel even though the current price of heating oil is now only
70 dollars per barrel. Buyer 2, on the other hand, would simply let their contract expire
and forfeit the premium amount of 3 dollars per barrel. Then they would purchase heating
oil at the prevailing market-rate of 70 dollars per barrel, making 73 dollars per barrel their
total cost. In this scenario both buyers obtained the same amount of heating oil but buyer
one ended up paying 7 dollars more per barrel than buyer two for the same amount of the
heating oil. Buyer 1 paid 7 dollars more than buyer 2 because buyer one paid 80 dollars
per barrel instead of 73 dollars per barrel when they purchased their contract.
Now let us use this same scenario but this time, at the time of expiration, heating
oil is trading for 90 dollars per barrel. Buyer 1 is happy that they purchased their contract
when heating oil was trading for 80 dollars per barrel and gladly pays the agreed upon 80
dollars per barrel. Buyer 2 feels good about this situation as well, because they can
exercise their call option to purchase heating oil at 83 dollars per barrel; in this scenario,
both buyers come out ahead. Buyer 1 is the bigger winner and saves 10 dollars per
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barrel. Since buyer 2 paid 83 dollars per barrel for a commodity that is trading for 90
dollars per barrel, they save 7 dollars per barrel.
So far we have seen how beneficial call options can be for a consumer, but there
are scenarios where that is not the case. Assume that heating oil is trading for 82 dollars
per barrel at contract expiration. Buyer 1 simply pays their agreed 80 dollars per barrel
price and saves 2 dollars per barrel. Buyer 2 will choose to execute their call option and
pay 83 dollars per barrel, putting them in a situation where they are paying 1 dollar more
than fair market value for heating oil. Buyer 2 chooses to execute their option instead of
letting it expire because of the 3-dollar premium associated with the call option. If buyer
2 had let the contract expire it would have forced them to purchase heating oil at 82
dollars per barrel off the spot market. This 82-dollar per barrel price plus the 3-dollar per
barrel premium cost would make their total cost equal 85 dollars per barrel. In either
situation buyer two is paying more per barrel than the fair market value.
Hedge
The undertaking of either a either a long or short position by purchasing futures
contracts or options contracts in order to mitigate exposure to price volatility. For
example, the purchase of heating oil futures contracts in July that is set to expire in
December (NYMEX, 2004).
If you are “going long” then you are a holder who has established a market
position by purchasing futures or options contracts with the anticipation that prices of the
underlying commodities will increase. From a profit perspective, a holder who maintains
a long position will profit if the price of the underlying security increases. A holder of a
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short position profits off a decrease in price for the underlying security. Consumers that
make bulk purchases such as electric companies, manufacturing companies, gasoline
station owners and other high volume buyers feel the need to protect themselves against
high acquisition cost. By taking a long position, companies can manage their exposure to
increasing prices by implementing this type of strategy (CME, 2006).
Similar Studies
The topic of fuel hedging has garnered many headlines over the past five years,
most of which can be contributed to the successful hedging strategy implemented by
Southwest airlines. Recognizing the success of Southwest and potential benefit that
could be gained by fuel hedging, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) urged the
Department of Defense (DoD) in 2004 to develop a strategy to include fuel hedging in its
risk-control arsenal to deal with the rampant prices of aviation fuel (Defense Business
Board, 2004). Despite this recommendation from OMB, there has been little analytical
research done in this arena by the DoD. The November 2006 edition of the Air Force
Journal of Logistics, the article “Fuel Hedging, A Lesson from the Airlines” by Lawrence
Spinetta highlighted the impact that volatility in the jet fuel price can have on the Air
Force budget. Spinetta advocated for the implementation of a fuel-hedging program
within the DoD (Spinetta, 2004). In March 2008 a Naval Post graduate Thesis titled
“Should the Department of Defense Hedge Oil Prices In Order To Save Money” written
by James Knapp suggested that the DoD should not enter into a hedging position due to
the negative public perception, inherent risk in hedging, and the lack of political support
(Knapp, 2008). Both of these studies make compelling arguments for their respective
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positions on the topic, but neither provides any analytical support to bolster their
argument. Although there has not been any quantitative research done on fuel hedging
from a DoD position, there has been published quantitative research done on currency
hedging.
Groshek and Felli (2000) ran a Monte Carlo simulation to determine the effects of
hedging the Air Force Overseas Operations and Maintenance budget in the Japanese Yen,
British Pound or German Mark. Of all of the hedging methods available, the authors
chose to use forward and option contracts as their instruments of choice. The authors
collected data from 1985 to 1998, providing them with a total 14 years of worth of
budgetary data. Their findings showed that using these hedging instruments would
achieve six to seven percent savings. They concluded that it would be in the best interest
of the DoD to utilize a hedging strategy with an emphasis placed on using options
(Groshek & Felli, 2000).
Edwards (2008) found that by using futures contracts to hedge against the EURO
from 2001 to 2007, on average the DOD could have realized 171 million dollars in
savings. This certainly emphasizes the importance of exploring the potential of using
hedges as a technique to increase budget stability (Edwards, 2008).
Risk Management
Confronted with the fact that risk is unavoidable when acquiring major weapon
systems, the DoD has outlined a path for its program managers to follow that will assist
them in managing risk associated with procuring weapon systems. The Risk
Management Guide for DoD Acquisitions identifies risk as, “A measure of future
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uncertainties in achieving program performance goals and objectives within defined cost,
schedule and performance constraints” (DAU, 2006). The basic definition of risk still
holds true when applied to other large acquisitions, such as the purchase of jet fuel.
Outside of investor profit maximization, one of the primary purposes of using
financial derivatives to implement a hedging strategy is to reduce market risk and
mitigate price volatility. Dr. Rene Stulz (1996) explores the apparent disconnect between
the theory and actual practice of corporate risk management. From a theory perspective,
companies facing a large amount of exposures to commodity prices can increase their
market values by using financial derivatives to create a hedge and reduce exposure, with
the primary emphasis of the hedge being a reduction in price variability. However, the
design of most hedging positions taken today is for the “elimination of costly lower-tail
outcomes -- that is to reduce the expected costs of financial trouble while preserving a
company’s ability to exploit any comparative advantage in risk-bearing it might have”
(Stulz, 1996). As an example of what can happen when a company implements a
hedging strategy that doesn’t aim at minimizing the variance, Stulz cites the example of
Metallgesellschaft Refining and Marketing (MGRM) in 1993 (Stulz, 1996). MGRM
implemented a strategy that hedged long-term oil commitments on a one-to-one basis
with short-term futures in 1993, believing they could profit from price movements due to
their specialized information about supply and demand. Unfortunately for MGRM, spot
prices fell dramatically during 1993. The decline in spot prices led to a financial loss of
1.25 billion dollars for MGRM, with over 800 million dollars in losses in the fourth
quarter alone forced MGRM into bankruptcy. MGRMs downfall illustrates the negative
consequences of what can happen when a company enters into a hedging strategy based
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off practice instead of theory. Had MGRM taken a theory approach to their hedging
strategy then they would have only had a hedging position that was large enough to
mitigate their exposure to downward price movement in the oil market. Instead, MGRM
practiced aggressive hedging tactics hoping to capitalize off their specialized supply and
demand information knowledge.
For another example of what can happen to a company when it does not
implement a good hedging strategy, you only need to look at the airline industry. United
Airlines had roughly 30 percent of its fuel consumption hedged for the first quarter of
2008 and experienced a 537 million dollar loss compared to Southwest, which had a 70
percent hedge that enabled it to garner a modest 34 million dollar profit (Gaffen, 2008).
United Airlines experienced costly financial losses by poorly hedging against what Dr.
Stultz would call “costly lower tail outcomes”. The understanding of theory behind risk
management and the implementation of its policies is critical to any corporation, clearly
portrayed throughout the literature on the topic. Hedging exposure to the price volatility
of jet fuel is one of the ways a company can attempt to minimize its risks.
The DoD will need to a pursue a hedging strategy that is designed to mitigate
exposure to price volatility. This strategy will not introduce speculation or seek to obtain
additional resources to offset other financial shortfalls. By practicing a smart hedging
strategy, the DoD will be able to moderate their exposure to oil price increases and avoid
it creating instability in the DoD budget. Increased budgetary stability during a time
when the DoD could be facing declining budgets is a step in the right direction.
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Legal Issues
The DoD faces three challenges that it must overcome before it can implement a
fuel hedging strategy. First, the DoD has no specific authority to engage in transactions
involving derivative products because the DoD’s general procurement is limited to
products and services. Second, the DoD lacks authority to derive cash benefit from
liquidated positions in financial markets. Currently, proceeds from liquidated positions
would go directly to the Treasury rather than into the DWCF. Third, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) has not addressed whether hedging budget risk is a “necessary
expense” for federal agencies. The necessary expense rule in the 2004 GAO Redbook
states:
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that where an
appropriation is made for a particular object, by implication it confers
authority to incur expenses which are necessary or proper or incident to
the proper execution of the object, unless there is another appropriation
which makes more specific provision for such expenditures, or unless they
are prohibited by law, or unless it is manifestly evident from various
precedent appropriation acts that Congress has specifically legislated for
certain expenses of the Government creating the implication that such
expenditures should not be incurred except by its express authority.
If the Comptroller General deemed that fuel hedging was a necessary expense then it
would be legal. Currently there is not an established formula for determining the
application of the necessary expense rule (GAO, 2004).
Market Implications
Due to the large quantity of jet fuel that the DoD procures on the spot market, it is
feasible that if the DoD did enter into a jet fuel hedging position by using heating oil
futures, it could increase the value of the heating oil futures contracts on the market.
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Currently, crude oil accounts for nearly 40 percent of the world’s energy and it is the
most actively traded physical commodity on the market today (NYMEX, 2007). Heating
oil accounts for roughly 25 percent of the yield of a barrel of crude, making it third on the
list behind gasoline (NYMEX, 2007). Multiple commercial businesses such as airlines,
trucking companies and other major consumers of fuel use heating oil to hedge fuel cost
by actively trading contracts on the market. Considering the demand for these contracts
both domestically and abroad, and the size of the market, it is my opinion that if the DoD
had purchased 120 contracts over ten years, it would probably not have a large impact
and sway the market in either direction.
Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we described several studies that look at fuel hedging and
currency hedging in the DoD. From these studies, we derive that hedging can be a useful
instrument in reducing cost for a multiyear program. In addition, we covered a plethora
of terminology, concepts and instruments that used in the financial community. Finally,
we looked at the legal barriers that currently exist that prevent the DoD from legally
implementing a fuel-hedging program and the market implications associated with the
DoD entering into a hedging position.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
This chapter describes the process that used to conduct this research. We begin
by outlining the data employed by this quantitative study, followed by an explanation of
how the hedge scenario works for both futures and call option contract. The last topic
addressed in this chapter is an explanation of the ex-post facto methodology used to
perform this study.
Data Measures
DESC provided monthly DoD fuel consumption data for this analysis. According
to DESC, the DoD procures roughly 50 percent of its jet fuel on the domestic spot market
while procuring the other 50 percent on foreign markets. Some of the fuel obtained off
the foreign market comes at a discount price and for that reason it was not included in
this analysis. The data collected for this analysis provides the total gallons procured on
the domestic market and the weighted average price per gallon for each specific month
from October 1995 to September 2007, enabling the study to start in FY96 and conclude
in FY07. The provided data represents the historic procurement cost per gallon for fuel
consumed by the DoD.
The commercial sector uses both heating oil and crude oil financial derivatives to
create jet fuel hedging positions, but heating oil derivates are the preferred instrument for
creating jet fuel hedges (NYMEX, 2007). In testing the correlation between heating oil
and jet fuel, I used over three thousand end of day historical prices for both of the
petroleum-based products and obtained a correlation factor of 0.9983. This factor was
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slightly higher than the 0.9964 factor that jet fuel and crude oil shared so; this analysis
only uses heating oil derivatives as the underlying.
This study uses heating oil futures data obtained from the Center for Futures
Trade Commission (CFTC) to match the DESC fuel procurement time frame. The data
provided from the CFTC is the settle price for each contract (November through October)
on the first business day of every fiscal year from FY96 through FY07. This analysis
used the end-of-day settle prices to prevent speculation from tampering with the results.
End-of-day settle prices are closing prices and reflect the amount a stock or commodity
traded at the close of business for that day. All futures contracts expire on the last
business day of the preceding month. For example, the September 2008 futures contract
expired on 29 August 2008.
The New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) provided financial data for
trading the underlying heating oil call option derivatives for the same timeframe. This
analysis will try to maintain an “at the money” position when determining the strike and
settle prices for call options. Since these are historical data, there are not “at the money”
prices for every month in every year. This analysis uses the closest strike price and settle
price when this occurs. If no strike price exists for a month, the corresponding DESC
weighted spot price is used and a hedge will not exist for that month. There were 9 strike
and settlement prices missing out of 144 needed to hedge the DoD for the timeframe of
this analysis. All call option contracts expire three business days prior to the futures
expiration date. For example, the September 2008 call options contract expired on 26
August 2008, whereas the September 2008 futures contract expires on 29 August 2008.
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Futures and options contracts were the financial derivatives utilized for this
analysis. Although other financial tools such as SWAPs and forwards are available on
the market to create a hedging position, they are not within the scope of this analysis.
This analysis used call options contracts instead of put option contracts. The DoD is a
not-for-profit entity and using call options to hedge against an increase in the spot price
of jet fuel is less speculative in nature. Therefore, any “in the money” gains realized
from executing a contract would not be perceived as profit but more so as a reduction of
cost. The DoD would not accept physical delivery at settlement instead the DoD would s
use the profit realized from executing the contract to offset the current spot price of jet
fuel. By engaging in this practice, the DoD would only use profits to offset fuel costs.
Transaction costs for purchasing futures and call options on the exchange, as well
as purchasing jet fuel on the spot market have not been included in this analysis. For
purchasing heating oil future or option contracts a buyer realizes NYMEX clearing cost,
commission fees and brokerage costs. The culmination of these expenses total between 4
to 12 dollars per contract traded. These costs are dependent upon clearing member status,
the total quantity traded, and the brokerage firm that is executing the trade. In a situation
when a consumer executes two contracts (each contract consisting of 42,000 gallons) the
transaction cost would range from 8 to 24 dollars. The buyer realizes a profit or loss
based on the spread between the Bid and Ask price, not the transaction expense.
Currently, DESC makes multiple purchases of jet fuel on the spot market throughout the
year. On many occasions, DESC makes several purchases of jet fuel on a daily basis.
These transaction cost do not deter DESC from making them in their current structure
and would not prevent them from making purchases on the commodities trading market.
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Transactions costs on either the spot or the futures market are simply the cost of doing
business and are absent from this analysis.
This analysis used the first day of the fiscal year as the execution date to establish
the hedging positions, typically the first trading day or business day of October. As
stated before, the closing or settle price on the underlying contract was chosen rather than
the open, high, or low price of the day; removing the effect of speculation. With the
fiscal year starting in October, contracts in the corresponding fiscal year were chosen
with expiration dates in November, December, January, February, March, April, May,
June, July, August, September and October. To cover all of the months by this hedging
position, the purchase of October contracts for the next fiscal year at the same time as the
other monthly contracts was completed. An example of this would be purchasing an
October 2007 contract in October 2006. For the first fiscal year, this analysis uses the
DESC purchase price for jet fuel in the month of October, as it will take one month to
create the hedging position.
This analysis will provide two hedging models for futures and two models for call
options, both derivatives will share the same models. The first model will show the “then
year” cost savings or loss resulting from the hedge. The second model will show the
“constant year” cost savings or loss resulting from the hedge. We will use the Gross
Domestic Product deflator to convert the “then year” dollars to “constant year” 2000
dollars. We converted the hedged results into “constant year” dollars to determine the
summation of the hedged savings or loss over the duration of the analysis. Constant year
2000 was chosen because the range of the fiscal years used in this analysis cover FY96
through FY07, thereby using cost data from 1995 to 2007.
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This hedging strategy analysis is passive, removing most of the analytical
responsibility from the individuals who manage the Defense Working Capital Fund
(DWCF). The manager of the DWCF would simply assume a zero percent, 25 percent,
50 percent, 75 percent, or 100 percent hedging position (either with futures or options) to
cover the jet fuel procured on the domestic spot market. By observing five different
hedging positions one will be able to determine the best and worst possible outcomes.
We have made no effort to determine whether the derivatives used in this analysis
are over or under valued; the assumption is that the “invisible hand” is at work and that
prices will change rapidly to reach equilibrium. Utilizing this passive/automated strategy
removes all responsibility for determining whether to initiate a contract from the analyst;
eliminating the possibility of the DoD introducing speculation into the market because
the analyst has such a minor role. The only thing the analyst will have to do is to decide
whether to execute the option or not.
Futures Hedge Mechanics
On the surface, a fuel hedge seems simple; a buyer purchases heating oil futures
contracts now with the intent of selling the contracts later to protect against future price
increases in jet fuel. The mechanics behind the hedge are not so simple, differing slightly
for futures and call option strategies.
When dealing with future contracts, the hedge decision-making process is
straightforward because the buyer has to abide by the specifications of the contract.
Table 3 represents the mechanics of a futures hedge for this analysis. All figures and
amounts shown in Table 4 are to be treated as fictitious as they are not the amounts used
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in the actual analysis. As mentioned before, for this analysis the purchase of the heating
oil futures contracts takes place starts on the first business day of the Fiscal Year.
Table 3. Hedging with Futures Scenario
Month
JP8 Total Gallons Purchased
DESC Un-hedged ppg
HO Futures Purchase ppg
HO Futures Closing ppg
Profit per gallon after sale
Jet Fuel Spot ppg at EOM
Hedged Price of Jet Fuel

Variable
A
B
C
D
D-C=E
F
F-E=G

Jan-96
84,000
0.65
0.50
0.59
0.09
0.60
0.51

Feb-96
126,000
0.55
0.60
0.54
-0.06
0.56
0.62

Mar-96
168,000
0.55
0.45
0.62
0.17
0.64
0.47

Apr-96
126,000
0.65
0.45
0.63
0.18
0.77
0.59

Using the information from Table 3, the following scenario will explain how the
futures hedge works. On the first business day of FY96, a buyer purchases a certain
quantity of heating oil futures contracts for January 1996 through April 1996, at the fair
market price (Variable C). The buyer holds the contract until it reaches expiration and
sells the contract at the current heating oil futures market price (Variable D). Upon
selling, the contract for a specific month either a gain or loss per gallon is realized
(Variable E). If the previous transaction realizes a profit, this amount per gallon will
decrease the current price per gallon of jet fuel (Variable F) by the same amount leaving
the buyer with their hedge price of jet fuel (Variable G). Since the buyer purchased a
certain quantity of heating oil futures, contracts the buyer can now purchase the same
quantity of jet fuel gallons at the hedged price of jet fuel.
Using the prices from Table 3, let us look at how the final “Hedged Price of Jet
Fuel” came to be for January 1996. On 1 October 1995, DESC purchased 84 thousand
gallons worth of January 1996 heating oil future contracts at a price of 0.50 dollars per
28

gallon. The contract expires on the last business day in January 1996; at that time, DESC
sells the January 1996 contract for the market price. The end of the month market price
for heating oil is 0.59 dollars per gallon, enabling DESC to make 0.09 dollars per gallon
profit. Since DESC is not a profit making organization, DESC takes the 0.09 dollars per
gallon they received off the transaction and uses it to offset the current spot price for jet
fuel. The spot price for jet fuel is 0.60 dollars per gallon on the last business day of
January 1996. DESC is able to offset this 0.60 dollar per gallon amount with 0.09 dollar
per gallon profit it made off the futures transaction, thereby giving DESC a 0.51 dollar
per gallon cost for jet fuel. At this 0.51 dollar per gallon price DESC would have a total
cost of 42,800 dollars for jet fuel if DESC hedged all of their gas consumption for the
month of January 1996. Note that for this scenario the un-hedge weighted average jet
fuel price per gallon for DESC was 0.65 dollars per gallon, meaning that DESC spent
54,600 dollars for 84 thousand gallons of jet fuel. The un-hedged scenario uses the
DESC weighted average jet fuel price per gallon because it most closely represents the
actual cost that DESC had for that actual month.
Most of the scenarios in Table 3 yield a lower hedged cost for jet fuel over the unhedged scenario. If a loss occurred instead of a profit when trading the futures contracts
for the current market value, this would force DESC to purchase jet fuel at the end of
month spot market price. For the month of February 1996, the purchase price for the
futures contracts is 0.60 dollars per gallon and the closing price is 0.54 dollars per gallon,
creating a loss of 0.06 dollars per gallon. Adding the 0.06-dollar loss to the 0.56 dollar
per gallon spot market price for jet fuel in February makes the total hedged cost for jet
fuel equal 0.62 dollars per gallon. The 0.62 dollar per gallon cost is 0.07 dollars more
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than the 0.55 dollar per gallon historical weighted DESC price. The total cost for the
hedged position would be 8,820 dollars more than the historical un-hedged position.
Call Option Hedge Mechanics
Call options hedging strategies follow a similar methodology to hedging with
futures but differ slightly due to the premium associated with the call option on futures
contract. Table 4 further depicts the call option strategy used for this analysis.
Table 4. Hedging with Call Option Scenario
Month
JP8 Total Gallons Purchased
DESC Un-hedged cost
HO Futures Strike ppg
HO Futures Settle
HO Call Option Settle
HO Strike with Premium
Profit off of Call
Jet Fuel Spot ppg
Gains or Loss From Hedge

Variable
A
B
C
D
E
C+E=F
D–F=G
H
H–G=I

Jan-96
84,000
0.65
0.50
0.59
0.01
0.51
0.08
0.60
0.52

Feb-96
126,000
0.55
0.50
0.49
0.01
0.51
-0.01
0.56
0.57

Mar-96
168,000
0.58
0.49
0.50
0.02
0.51
-0.01
0.64
0.65

Apr-96
126,000
0.65
0.48
0.63
0.02
0.50
0.13
0.77
0.64

Many of the same steps from the futures hedge process hold for the call options
strategy, but the premium does change things slightly. To state the obvious, since the
buyer has the option, they will only do so when it is to their advantage. In most
instances, when the buyer calls an option the buyer receives a profit (Variable G). It is
important to note that a buyer will still call an option if the loss incurred from calling the
option is less than the cost of the premium. The delta between the heating oil closing
price (Variable D) and the total price of the call option (Variable F) determines the profit
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(Variable G). Using the profit per gallon (Variable G) to reduce the jet fuel spot price
(Variable H) creates the final price per gallon available because of the hedge (Variable I).
The following example of hedging with call options uses the price amounts shown
in Table 4. On the first day of fiscal year 1996 for the January 1996 heating oil call
option, the strike price is 0.50 dollars per gallon and the premium is 0.01 dollars per
gallon, providing a total cost of 0.51 dollars per gallon. At the time of expiration, the
January 1996 heating oil futures are trading for 0.59 dollars per gallon. DESC would call
the option and pay 0.51 dollars per gallon for 84,000 gallons. DESC would then sell
those same 84,000 gallons at the market price of 0.59 dollars per gallon, thereby making
a 0.08 dollar per gallon profit off the sale. DESC would then use that 0.08-dollar profit
per gallon to offset the current market 0.60 dollar per gallon spot price for jet fuel,
thereby giving DESC a final cost of 0.52 dollars per gallon for jet fuel. In this scenario, it
was in DESCs best interest to call the option but that is not always the case.
At the time of expiration, if the price of heating oil futures is less that the total
cost of the call option, then it is probably in DESCs best interest to let the call expire. By
letting the call expire, DESC forfeits the premium or settle amount associated with that
contract. In doing so, DESC adds the forfeited settlement amount to the jet fuel spot
price, which creates a higher price per gallon that DESC pays due to the hedge. Using
the data from Table 4, for the month of February 1996, DESC would forfeit the premium
and realize the loss. The February 1996 strike price is 50 cents per gallon and the
premium is 1 cent per gallon, creating a total cost of 51 cents per gallon. At the time of
expiration, the closing price for heating oil futures is 49 cents per gallon. This is a 2-cent
difference and in this instance, it would be best for DESC to let the option expire and
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accept the 1-cent cost of the premium as a loss. DESC would have to add that 1-cent loss
to the spot market price of 0.56 dollars per gallon and realize a 0.57 dollar per gallon
final cost for jet fuel for February 1996. Since heating oil futures were less than the total
cost of the call option for February 1996, it was in DESCs best interest to let the call
expire. Note, though, that this is not always the case.
There are instances when DESC will call the option even though the futures price
is less than the total cost of the call option. Using the price from Table 4 for the month of
March 1996, the strike price is 0.49 dollars per gallon and the premium is 0.02 dollars per
gallon for call options. This total price of 0.51 dollars per gallon is more than the 0.50
dollar per gallon price of heating oil futures at that time. In this case, DESC will call the
option despite the futures price being less than the total cost of the call. They do this
because the delta between the total cost of the option and the futures price is 0.01 dollars
per gallon, which is less than the 0.02 dollar per gallon premium. By calling the option,
DESC incurs less of a loss on the resale of the futures than if they forfeited the premium.
Using call options can create profitable situations for the buyer as well as
minimize financial losses. As shown in the previous examples, call options provide the
buyer the power of choice and can be extremely beneficial for the holder. This power of
choice is a luxury and comes with an additional price, but it can be worth it in the end.
Data Analysis
This is an ex post facto analysis; the data is analyzed to determine what the results
would have been if the DOD had implemented a hedge position either with futures
contracts or call options contracts on futures for heating oil at the beginning of each fiscal
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year. For this analysis, the purchase of all hedging contracts occurred at the beginning of
each fiscal year. In terms of call option contracts, this analysis will execute “at the
money” or “in the money” contracts upon the expiration date of the contract. This
analysis will execute “out of the money” contracts when the loss associated with the
execution is less than the premium cost of the option contract.
This analysis will compare the net difference in these hedged trades on a monthly
basis to the non-hedged results over this twelve-year period to determine potential
savings. The results from this methodology should reveal which hedging position (if
any) would have provided the greatest amount of savings to DoD for that timeframe. The
DoD procures jet fuel constantly during the fiscal year. Table 5 illustrates the percentage
of DoD jet fuel purchased per month for each fiscal year.
Table 5. Monthly DoD Jet Fuel Procurement Percentages
Fiscal
Year
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
Mean
Std Dev

1st Quarter
2nd Quarter
3rd Quarter
4th Quarter
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep
7.1 8.5 7.3 8.4 8.1 10.2 9.3
8.1 8.8 8.3 7.3 8.5
7.6 7.9 6.9 7.1 9.0
9.1 8.6
8.2 9.0 8.5 8.6 9.7
7.5 9.3 6.7 6.9 8.0
7.5 8.2
9.5 9.4 8.8 9.9 8.2
7.8 7.8 8.9 7.2 7.1
8.7 9.4
8.1 9.0 8.1 9.2 8.6
6.8 7.6 8.0 8.7 7.9
7.5 8.9
7.9 9.9 10.4 7.7 8.6
7.9 7.2 6.9 9.2 7.2
7.8 9.4
8.9 8.3 8.1 9.6 9.5
8.7 8.2 7.7 8.2 8.4 10.2 8.2
8.2 8.8 7.2 7.5 8.9
9.1 6.3 9.4 8.1 9.1
7.0 7.8
9.6 7.1 8.5 9.1 8.8
8.9 6.6 7.7 6.7 7.3
9.3 9.7
7.9 9.7 9.3 9.2 7.5
9.5 8.5 8.6 6.8 6.6
9.6 8.1
9.9 9.3 8.2 8.2 6.7
9.2 7.7 9.2 6.5 7.7
9.2 8.0
8.4 8.8 8.9 8.4 7.9
6.7 7.1 7.0 9.0 7.9
9.0 7.6
9.1 9.0 10.4 8.8 8.3
8.1 7.7 7.9 7.7 7.9
8.8 8.6
8.7 8.9 8.7 8.6 8.4
1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.7
1.1 0.7
0.7 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.8
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As shown in Table 5, most of the time, the DoD roughly procures between seven
and nine percent of its annual consumption amount of jet fuel each month. From a
quarterly perspective, the DoD procures roughly twenty-five percent of its annual amount
of jet fuel each quarter, thus illustrating a relatively constant purchase stream. This
constant purchase stream means that the DoD can target each month equally when
planning a hedge instead of targeting a few months for bulk purchases when creating a
hedge.
Using the research to show causality and to create a direct hypothesis is two of the
most prominent difficulties of using an ex post facto experiment (Babbie, 1986). Studies
overcome these hurdles by limiting the subjects researched and the amount of variables
tested. Additionally, in ex post facto experiments based off historical numerical data, the
experimenter can control the amount of variables used in the study to avoid these
problems.
Chapter Summary
This chapter sets forth our quantitative ex-post facto methodology. Further, we
discussed how this analysis would deal with missing values. In addition, we explained
the mechanics of a fuel hedge, how it functions when using future and call option
derivatives. Finally, we explained the different hedging positions that were going to be
testing in order to find which (if any) would yield the greatest savings for the DoD
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IV. Results and Discussion
Chapter Overview
The chapter reviews the results of the hedge models used in this analysis. We will
examine the results of the futures hedging model in “then year” and “constant year” terms
first. Secondly, we will assess the call option hedging model results in “then year” and
“constant year” denominations.
Hedging with Futures Results and Analysis
After running the futures models, it became apparent that hedging jet fuel with
heating oil futures would have saved the DoD money; Table 6 shows the then year results
of this analysis. Each hedge position in Table 6 shows the annual savings or loss realized
after comparing the hedged amount to the historical price paid by DESC for that fiscal
year. Positive values in Table 6 indicate that the hedge outperformed the historic DESC
purchase price, while negative values indicate that purchasing off of the spot market was
a better deal for the DoD in that fiscal year. The average savings row at the bottom of
Table 6 is simply the average for the entire column. The Average Savings row shows
that even with losses over the twelve-year period the hedge position outperformed
purchasing jet fuel off the spot market. Over the twelve-year period used for this
analysis, hedge positions outperformed buying off the spot market eight times, creating
millions of dollars worth of savings.
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Table 6. Annual Then Year Results of Hedging with Futures
Fiscal
Year
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
Avg. Savings

Hedge Position
25%
50%
75%
100%
$41,598,030 $83,196,061 $124,794,091 $166,392,122
$12,024,421 $24,048,843
$36,073,264
$48,097,686
-$43,277,592 -$86,555,184 -$129,832,776 -$173,110,368
-$3,732,707
-$7,465,415 -$11,198,122 -$14,930,830
$87,226,900 $174,453,800 $261,680,700 $348,907,600
$2,504,828
$5,009,656
$7,514,484
$10,019,312
-$7,279,629 -$14,559,259 -$21,838,888 -$29,118,518
$35,604,752 $71,209,503 $106,814,255 $142,419,007
$103,349,627 $206,699,253 $310,048,880 $413,398,507
$112,022,366 $224,044,732 $336,067,098 $448,089,464
-$31,885,395 -$63,770,790 -$95,656,185 -$127,541,580
$1,445,364
$2,890,729
$4,336,093
$5,781,458
$25,800,080 $51,600,161
$77,400,241 $103,200,322

According to the model, the greater the hedge position the higher the savings for
the DoD. In then-year terms, on average the DoD could have realized a 103.2 million
dollar savings per year had it hedged all of its jet fuel purchases over the twelve-year
period. It is important to note that in this model the DoD would have realized losses in
FY98, FY99, FY02 and FY06 had it taken any hedging position. The impacts of these
losses are better understood in the Constant Year model, Table 7.

.

Table 7 shows the results of Table 6 in constant year 2000 dollars. As mentioned
in Chapter 3, we used the gross domestic product deflator to convert the values from
Table 6 into constant year 2000 dollars. Since all of the values are now the same constant
year 2000 denomination, Table 7 adds a total row to the analysis. With the total row
added, we can now show how much money the DoD could have saved over the twelveyear period had it hedged with futures.
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Table 7. Annual Constant Year 2000 Results of Hedging with Futures
Fiscal
Year
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
Total
Avg. Savings

25%
$45,163,215
$12,812,110
-$45,357,696
-$3,869,213
$89,127,089
$2,504,828
-$7,109,083
$34,173,891
$97,129,456
$102,339,045
-$28,208,676
$1,238,785
$299,943,752
$24,995,313

Hedge Position
50%
75%
100%
$90,326,429
$135,489,644
$180,652,859
$25,624,220
$38,436,330
$51,248,440
-$90,715,392 -$136,073,088 -$181,430,784
-$7,738,427
-$11,607,640
-$15,476,853
$178,254,179
$267,381,268
$356,508,358
$5,009,656
$7,514,484
$10,019,312
-$14,218,165
-$21,327,248
-$28,436,330
$68,347,782
$102,521,673
$136,695,564
$194,258,913
$291,388,369
$388,517,825
$204,678,091
$307,017,136
$409,356,182
-$56,417,352
-$84,626,028 -$112,834,704
$2,477,569
$3,716,354
$4,955,139
$599,887,503
$899,831,255 $1,199,775,007
$49,990,625
$74,985,938
$99,981,251

On average, over the twelve-year period the DoD could have saved roughly 100
million dollars per year on jet fuel had it hedged 100 percent of its’ domestic fuel
purchases. In addition, the DoD could have saved 1.2 billion dollars over the twelve-year
period had it hedged all of its’ jet fuel expense with heating oil futures. Hedging with
futures would have yielded positive results 8 out of the possible 12 years used in this
analysis. The largest loss occurred in FY98, in the 100 percent hedge scenario this would
have been a loss of 181 million dollars. The greatest savings was realized in FY05, for
the 100 percent scenario this savings totaled to 409 million dollar for the DoD. The total
savings achieved would be more than enough to pay any additional overhead costs
realized in order to execute the strategy.
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Hedging with Call Options Results and Analysis
The call option models provided positive results as well; Table 8 shows the results
of this analysis. Over the twelve-year period used for this analysis, hedge positions
outperformed the historical DESC purchase price in every fiscal year.
Table 8. Annual Then Year Results of Hedging with Call Options
Fiscal
Year
96
96
96
96
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
Avg Savings

25%
$28,877,788
$8,929,925
$10,199,133
$15,362,713
$58,131,251
$3,003,746
$3,884,655
$18,305,421
$103,805,624
$106,791,151
$18,583,369
$22,841,801
$33,226,381

Hedge Position
50%
75%
$57,755,576
$86,633,364
$17,859,850
$26,789,775
$20,398,265
$30,597,398
$30,725,427
$46,088,140
$116,262,502
$174,393,753
$6,007,491
$9,011,237
$7,769,309
$11,653,964
$36,610,842
$54,916,263
$207,611,248
$311,416,872
$213,582,302
$320,373,453
$37,166,739
$55,750,108
$45,683,603
$68,525,404
$66,452,763
$99,679,144

100%
$115,511,152
$35,719,700
$40,796,531
$61,450,854
$232,525,004
$12,014,982
$15,538,618
$73,221,684
$415,222,495
$427,164,604
$74,333,478
$91,367,206
$132,905,526

Once again, the greater the hedge positions the higher the savings for the DoD. In
then-year terms, on average the DoD could have realized a 132.9 million dollar savings
per year had it hedged all of its jet fuel purchases over the twelve-year period.
Table 9 shows the results of Table 8 in constant year 2000 dollars. Table 9 is
similar to Table 7 in that it uses the GDP deflator to convert the then year dollars into
constant year terms and it has a total row at the bottom of the table. Therefore, all of the
results of this analysis are in constant year 2000 dollars.
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Table 9. Annual Constant Year 2000 Results of Hedging with Call Options
Fiscal
Year
96
96
96
96
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
Total
Avg Savings

25%
$31,352,776
$9,514,901
$10,689,346
$15,924,531
$59,397,608
$3,003,746
$3,793,645
$17,569,774
$97,558,009
$97,560,022
$16,440,513
$19,577,121
$382,381,992
$31,865,166

Hedge Position
50%
75%
$62,705,552
$94,058,328
$19,029,803
$28,544,704
$21,378,692
$32,068,038
$31,849,062
$47,773,593
$118,795,216
$178,192,824
$6,007,491
$9,011,237
$7,587,290
$11,380,935
$35,139,549
$52,709,323
$195,116,018
$292,674,027
$195,120,044
$292,680,065
$32,881,026
$49,321,539
$39,154,242
$58,731,362
$764,763,984
$1,147,145,976
$63,730,332
$95,595,498

100%
$125,411,104
$38,059,605
$42,757,384
$63,698,124
$237,590,432
$12,014,982
$15,174,580
$70,279,098
$390,232,036
$390,240,087
$65,762,052
$78,308,483
$1,529,527,968
$127,460,664

On average, over the twelve-year period the DoD could have saved 127.5 million
dollars per year on jet fuel had it hedged 100 percent of its’ domestic fuel purchases.
This analysis also shows that the DoD could have saved 1.5 billion dollars over the
twelve-year period had it hedged all of its jet fuel expense with heating oil call options.
For the timeframe of this analysis, the DoD would have had positive returns for each FY.
The smallest savings occurred in FY02, in the 100 percent hedge scenario the savings
would have been a loss of 12 million dollars. The 100 percent hedge returned provided
two year that realized 390.2 million dollars in savings. The savings realized would easily
offset any additional cost realized by hiring the personal to implement the hedge or the
transaction costs associated with the trade.
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Both derivatives returned positive results for the DoD, with options
outperforming futures by nearly 300 million dollars over the 12 year period. Future
contracts have the potential to create the largest savings for the DoD but, they also come
with the greatest amount of risk. Bearing that in mind, futures seem to be a good
selection for a customer who is “risk loving”. Options on the other hand are more
appropriate for a customer who is risk adverse and as shown in the analysis, the payoffs
are not as big but neither are the losses. The DoD in general is not a “risk loving”
organization and tends to be risk adverse. This risk adverse mentality makes call options
the ideal tool for the DoD to use when implementing a fuel hedge.
It is important to note that the results of this analysis reflect a timeframe in which
the price of crude oil was generally rising. This upward trend in price undoubtedly
affected the results of hedging with futures and options in a positive manner and needs to
be recognized. However, since September 2008, the crude oil market has experienced a
downward trend in price and this negative trend would affect the performance of hedging
with each derivative differently. Buyers that used heating oil futures to make their hedge
would be held to the purchase price of the heating oil futures contract and pay the agreed
upon amount. Heating Oil futures closed for 2.84 dollars per gallon on 1 October 2008
and as of 18 February 2009, the price for heating oil futures is 1.14 dollars per gallon.
Using futures in this instance would have cost a buyer 1.70 dollars more per gallon than
simply purchasing fuel off the spot market. As we know, a buyer using options on the
other hand would simply let their call expire and pay their premium. In the end, the call
option buyer still benefits because the price of jet fuel has decreased with the price of
crude oil and they are now paying a lower price for fuel than they had planned. Large
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negative price trends are rare for a high demand limited supply item such as crude oil.
Negative price trends are not necessarily a bad thing, depending on the derivative used
for creating a hedge, as one can still benefit from the price decline if options are used to
create the hedge.
Options are the best selection for the DoD, but future contracts should not be
completely ignored when creating a hedge. Undoubtedly, using an optimal mixture of
options and futures to create the fuel hedge would be the dominant hedging strategy.
This analysis looked at the market volatility in an attempt to uncover a pattern that would
suggest using one derivative over the other.
Market Volatility Analysis
The premise for this analysis is that when faced with certain levels of market
volatility one derivative would be preferential over the other for hedging. One
characteristic of market volatility is the variance in price for that month. A large variance
in price would indicate a highly volatile market for that month while a small variance in
price would indicate a less volatile market.
This analysis used daily data obtained from the EIA to determine the monthly
variance in price for heating oil futures from October 1995 to September 2007. The
monthly variance in price was tested to see how strongly correlated it was with results
from hedging with option and futures for the corresponding month. The results from this
analysis indicate that there is a weak correlation between both of the derivatives and the
variance in price. The correlation factor between price variance and the results from
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hedging with futures was 0.2496, while the correlation factor between price variance and
the results for hedging with options was 0.2495.
Unfortunately, both of these correlation factors are weak and do not shed any
additional light on the topic. In the end, price variance did not seem to matter when it
came to derivative performance, even in the later years of the analysis when market
volatility drove up the cost of call option premiums.
Quantity Hedged
Providing jet fuel price stability is the target goal of this analysis. With the
positive results in hand, it is now time to determine how much fuel the DoD should
hedge. To make this determination we are going to compare the results from hedging
with futures and options to the projected DESC fuel cost for each FY used in this
analysis. For this analysis the projected DESC cost will simply be the DESC standard
price that is set at the beginning of the FY multiplied by the quantity of gallons purchased
for the corresponding FY. By subtracting the cost for each hedge position from the
projected DESC cost we will be able to determine if that hedge position would be
sufficient in covering the projected DESC cost for the FY. Results from this analysis for
futures are shown in Table 10.
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Table 10. Future Hedge Position Cost vs Projected DESC Cost
Fiscal
Year
96
96
96
96
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
Avg Savings

25%
$ 657,300,657
$ 184,865,851
$ 1,069,201,029
$ 885,111,024
$
52,608,584
$ 664,286,097
$ 597,460,198
$
22,772,726
$ (159,244,520)
$ (269,040,607)
$ 156,773,040
$ 489,418,720
$ 362,626,067

Hedge Position
50%
75%
$ 698,898,687
$ 740,496,718
$ 196,890,272
$ 208,914,694
$ 1,025,923,437
$ 982,645,845
$ 881,378,316
$ 877,645,609
$ 139,835,484
$ 227,062,384
$ 666,790,925
$ 669,295,754
$ 590,180,568
$ 582,900,939
$
58,377,477
$ 93,982,229
$ (55,894,893)
$ 47,454,734
$ (157,018,241)
$ (44,995,875)
$ 124,887,645
$ 93,002,250
$ 490,864,085
$ 492,309,449
$ 388,426,147
$ 414,226,227

100%
$ 782,094,748
$ 220,939,115
$ 939,368,253
$ 873,912,901
$ 314,289,284
$ 671,800,582
$ 575,621,310
$ 129,586,981
$ 150,804,361
$ 67,026,491
$ 61,116,855
$ 493,754,813
$ 440,026,308

Positive numbers indicate that hedge position was sufficient in covering the
projected DESC cost for that FY while negative numbers indicate the contrary. The
results of this analysis indicate that hedging 100 percent of the domestic fuel purchase
with futures would have been sufficient each year to cover the projected DESC cost. The
100 percent hedge position was able to consistently outperform the projected DESC cost
in this analysis because the DESC standard price for jet fuel was higher than the spot
market price that was used for the results in Table 6. Therefore, even though the costs for
the 100 percent hedging position were higher than the market price, they were still lower
than the projected DESC cost. The results from this analysis for the call option model are
shown in Table 11.
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Table 11. Call Option Hedge Position Cost vs Projected DESC Cost
Fiscal
Year
96
96
96
96
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
Avg Savings

25%
$ 644,580,414
$ 181,771,354
$ 1,122,677,754
$ 904,206,444
$
23,512,935
$ 664,785,015
$ 608,624,482
$
5,473,395
$ (158,788,522)
$ (274,271,822)
$ 207,241,804
$ 510,815,157
$ 370,052,368

Hedge Position
50%
75%
$ 673,458,202
$ 702,335,990
$ 190,701,279
$ 199,631,205
$ 1,132,876,887
$ 1,143,076,019
$ 919,569,158
$ 934,931,871
$
81,644,186
$ 139,775,437
$ 667,788,760
$ 670,792,506
$ 612,509,136
$ 616,393,791
$
23,778,816
$
42,084,237
$ (54,982,899)
$
48,822,725
$ (167,480,671)
$ (60,689,519)
$ 225,825,174
$ 244,408,543
$ 533,656,959
$ 556,498,760
$ 403,278,749
$ 436,505,130

100%
$ 731,213,778
$ 208,561,130
$ 1,153,275,152
$ 950,294,585
$ 197,906,688
$ 673,796,252
$ 620,278,446
$
60,389,658
$ 152,628,349
$
46,101,632
$ 262,991,913
$ 579,340,561
$ 469,731,512

The results from this analysis are similar to the futures results in that only 100
percent hedge position consistently outperforms the projected DESC cost. Both
comparison models show consistent average savings and indicate that either derivative
could be used to provide stable fuel costs for the DoD.
Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we showed that hedging with both types of derivatives would have
provided savings for the DoD. In comparison, call options provided a larger savings for
the DoD than the futures did over the twelve-year period. Specifically, in constant year
terms hedging with call options averaged nearly 27.5 million dollars per year more than
hedging with futures. Additionally, the call option model grossed nearly 300 million
more in savings than the futures model over the twelve-year period.
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V. Conclusions
Explanation of the Problem
Since 2003, the price of jet fuel has been very volatile and difficult for OMB to
forecast accurately. These two factors have created an environment in which a DESC
standard price for jet fuel is not stable. With the component services relying heavily on
the DESC standard price for budgetary purposes, changes to the standard price during the
fiscal year creates financial havoc for the DoD. These times of financial hardship force
the services to seek supplemental funding from congress to stay mission ready. The
models provided in this paper offer a “what if” the DoD had entered into a fuel hedge
analysis. This analysis provides DoD leadership with sound historical based analysis to
support the use of implementing a fuel hedging position to mitigate financial losses due
to increasing jet fuel prices. This mitigation of financial loss will help alleviate the
financial drain placed on the DESC and enable the creation of a stable standard price for
jet fuel.
Restatement of Results
The results of this analysis indicated that the DoD would benefit from undertaking
a hedging position by realizing a reduction in cost for jet fuel purchases. Overall both
derivative instruments yielded positive results but the call option models constantly
delivered positive returns for the DoD, indicating that call options are the dominant
hedging instrument between the two selections. The DoD should consider utilizing either
of the aforementioned derivatives to create a fuel hedge for future use.
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Recommendations
We recommend that the DoD consider a pilot program that uses call options to
hedge a portion of their jet fuel expense. Since this would be a pilot program, we
recommend that the DoD hedge 25 percent of its domestic fuel consumption in order to
test the viability of the program. This 25 percent hedge would only be equal to roughly
12.5 percent of the DoDs total jet fuel consumption because DESC only purchases
roughly 50 percent of DoDs fuel on the domestic market. Although the results of this
analysis indicate that only the 100 percent hedge position consistently outperform the
projected DESC cost, it is our belief that the DWCF would sustain the minor losses that
occur in the 25 percent hedge position. With all of the data available from this pilot
program, the DoD would be in a better position to determine if they wanted to continue
with the hedging program or in-fact increase the size of the hedge to reduce their
exposure even further for future purchases.
Limitations
There are several limitations to using an ex post facto analysis. Making a causal
statement between the implementation of a fuel hedging position and budgetary stability
for the DoD is one of those limitations. Past performance in no way predicts future
results. Over the twelve year period of this analysis, hedging positions based off futures
and call options yielded financial savings for the DoD, but this does not mean these type
of hedging positions will always create financial savings in the future. The price of jet
fuel tracks the price of crude oil and the only thing that has been consistent about the
price of crude is that it is constantly changing. As fast as the price of oil rose from 2003
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to 2008, it fell even faster in late 2008 by dropping nearly 100 dollars per barrel in three
months. This rapid decrease in price could have created a situation in which a fuel hedge
based off either derivative would return a loss for the DoD.
Another important item to note in this analysis is that when hedging using
options, in no case was 100 percent of the data available to create a historical hedge
based solely off call options. As mentioned earlier, this analysis used the closest strike
price to the “at the money” position to create the hedge. However, there were instances
when no strike price available for a month and the analysis used the historical DESC
weighted price for those occurrences. Despite these shortcomings, the data clearly
indicates that a passive hedging strategy using futures or call options would have
produced positive results over the twelve-year period.
Recommendations for Future Research
The results of this research are very self-explanatory and leave little room for
additional research except for two areas. A thorough evaluation of the federal laws that
govern or restrict this type of program is required. This paper identified the major legal
obstacle preventing the DoD from implementing a hedging program but, it did not cover
the matter in extensive legal detail. With the positive results of this research in hand, a
focused look into the legal matter is justified.
Additional research is needed to uncover the optimal mixture of derivatives to be
used when creating a fuel hedge for the DoD. Similar to an investment portfolio, a fuel
hedge should have some diversity. This diversity could involve using call option and

47

futures contracts based off of heating oil and crude oil. The commercial sector uses both
commodities to create fuel hedges and this avenue could be explored for the DoD as well.
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